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NOTES
Private Annuities: Revenue Ruling 69-74-Its Significance,
Effect,' and Validity
I. BACKGROUND

The private or noncommercial annuity may be defined as the
transfer of property from an annuitant-transferor to a person or
organization (referred to as the transferee or obligor) that has not
"from ti.me to time"' issued annuity contracts, in exchange for the
transferee's unsecured promise to make periodic payments of money
for a fixed time or for the life of the annuitant-transferor. 2 Prior to the
issuance of Revenue Ruling 69-74,3 both the Internal Revenue Service
and the courts had given the private annuity transaction favorable
income tax treatment,4 making it an extremely useful estate planning
1. See Rev. Rul. 62-136, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 12, discussed in notes 82-83 infra and
accompanying text.
2. See Ekman, Utility of PrivateAnnuities in Estate Planning, N.Y.U. 27TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 421, 422 (1969); Middleditch, Mechanics of the Private Annuity as an Estate Planning
Device, 15TH ANN. TUL. TAX INsT. 469, 469-70 (1965); Wallace, Taxation of PrivateAnnuities,
40 B.U.L. REv. 349, 349-50 (1960). An example of a typical private annuity transaction between
a father and his closely-held corporation is set out in McGiveran &. Lynch, Private Annuities, 13
J. Am. Soc'Y C.L.U. 14, 14-15 (1958).
3. 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 43.
4. The gift and estate tax consequences of the private annuity arrangement can also be quite
favorable. There is no taxable gift if (1) the fair market value of the property transferred equals
the actuarial value of the annuity, and (2) the purchase price is the result of arms-length
bargaining; that is, there is no donative intent. This second requirement is generally a problem
where the transaction involves closely-related parties. See Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T.C. 1073
(1948); Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, I T.C. 543 (1943)
With respect to the estate tax, the transfer effectively removes the property from the gross
estate of the transferor, except to the extent that the gift element could be considered a gift in
contemplation of death. The annuitant can, however, at the time of the transfer create evidence
that it was not in contemplation of death. E.g., Des Portes v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 598,
601 (E.D.S.C. 1959) (fact that annuitant made transfer without legal advice demonstrated that
he was not concerned with disposing of his property in contemplation of death); Estate of Hilda
M. Lenna, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 803, 806 (1960) (evidence that stock was transferred in order
to maintain family control of a closely-held corporation demonstrated that it was not a transfer
in contemplation of death). Moreover, in certain instances, courts have deemed the annuitant to
have retained a life estate in the property transferred: First, where the annuity payments are
measured and paid out of the income derived from the property (Updike v. Commissioner, 88
F.2d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 1937); Estate of Cornelia B. Schwartz, 9 T.C. 229, 237-38 (1947); Rev.
Rul. 55-378, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 447)); second, where the use or resale of the property or its
proceeds is restricted (Greene v. United States, 237 F.2d 848, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1956)); third, where
the annuity transaction is secured (Tips v. Bass, 21 F.2d 460, 462 (W.D. Tex. 1927); Estate of
Cornelia B. Schwartz, supra at 237)).
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device. In J. Darsie Lloyd, s the Board of Tax Appeals applied the
principle of Burnet v. Logan6 to a private annuity and held that an

annuitant-father realizes no immediate gain when he transfers
appreciated stock to his son, in exchange for the son's promise to pay

his father a life annuity. Dealing with the question of when the
annuitant will be required to report his gain, the court in Hill's Estate
v. Maloney7 concluded that (1)the gain should commence to be taxed

when the total payments received under the annuity contract equal the
cost basis of the property transferred, and (2) the entire amount of each

payment thereafter received should be taxed as capital gain until the
total payments received under the contract equal the fair market value

of the property at the time of the transfer. In its only ruling regarding
the income tax consequences of private annuity transactions issued
prior to Revenue Ruling 69-74, the Service adopted the two basic

conclusions of the court in Hill's Estate.8 The only modification made
by the IRS was its ruling that the payments received by the annuitant,
which are first applied in reduction of his basis and then as gain from
the sale of the property, must be reduced for amounts taxed under the
annuity rules.9 Once the full amount of gain has been taxed, the
majority and better view would treat the "excluded portion"', of any
excess payments as tax-free to the annuitant."
5. 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936), nonacquiesced in,XV-2 Cum. BULL. 39 (1936), nonacquiescence
withdrawn and acquiesced in, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 3. In the Board's opinion, the son's promise
to pay his father a life annuity had no ascertainable fair market value because of "the uncertainty
as to whether or not the one agreeing to make payments will be able to make them as agreed
when the time for payment actually arrives." 33 B.T.A. at 905. The Lloyd holding has been
followed consistently by the courts. E.g., Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir.
1949); Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1940); Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp.
164 (D.N.J. 1944); Bella Hommel, 7 T.C. 992 (1946); Frank C. Deering, 40 B.T.A. 984 (1939).
6. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
7. 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944).
8. Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 53. The IRS specifically adopted the holding in J.
Darsie Lloyd and Commissioner v. Kann 's Estate. Id.at 54.
9. Only the "excluded portion" of each annuity payment will be considered as a recovery
of basis; and only such "excluded portion," after basis is fully recouped, will be taxed as gain
realized from the sale of property. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 treated the "excluded
portion" as "the excess of the amount received in the taxable year over an amount equal to 3
per centum of the aggregate premiums or consideration paid [note 16 infra] for such annuity
.... "INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 22(b)(2)(A). The 3% of "the aggregate premiums or
consideration paid" represents the interest element and is taxable at ordinary rates. Under the
1954 Code, the "excluded portion" is computed by dividing the cost of the annuity ("the
aggregate premiums or consideration paid [note 16 infra] for such annuity") by the annuitant's
remaining life expectancy and multiplying the resulting fraction by the amount of the total
payments received in the taxable year. INT. REV. CODS of 1954, § 72(b). The remainder of each
payment represents the interest element, taxable as ordinary income.
10. The "excluded portion" equals the total amount of the annuity payment less the interest element. See note 9 supra.
11. The 1939 Code provided that annuity payments in excess of 3% of the consideration
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In Revenue Ruling 69-74, the advice of the IRS was requested as

to the tax treatment, for federal income and gift tax'purposes, of a
transfer of monthly payments received under the following

circumstances. The taxpayer, age 74, transferred to his son a capital
asset, having an adjusted basis of 20,000 dollars and a fair market

value of 60,000 dollars, in exchange for the son's promise to pay the
taxpayer a life annuity of 7,200 dollars per year in equal monthly
installments of 600 dollars: On these facts, the Service ruled as follows:

but it
(1) The annuitant realizes capital gain12 immediately,
3

will be payable over his remaining life expectancy.

(2) In computing the "exclusion ratio,' ' 4 the annuitant's
paid for the annuity were to be excluded from gross income only "until the aggregate amount
excluded from gross income . . . equals the aggregate premiums or consideration paid [note 16
infra] for such annuity." INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 22(b)(2)(A). When payments totaling the
fair market value of the transferred property were received by the annuitant, all payments received
thereafter were to be included in gross income. Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164, 174
(D.N.J. 1944); Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 53. Unlike the 1939 Code, the 1954 Code
contains no limitation on how long the annuity rules apply to the payments received by the
annuitant. Furthermore, prior to Rev. Rul. 69-74, there were no decisions or rulings under the
1954 Code which answered the question of the proper income tax treatment of payments received
after gain from the sale of the property was fully reported. While it has been suggested that the
"excluded portion" of each payment may continue to be taxed as gain from the sale of property
(e.g., Ross, The Private Annuity as a Tax Minimizing Instrument, 41 TAXES 199, 207 (1963)),
the overwhelming majority of the commentators adopt the view that the balance of each payment
should be treated as nontaxable excess capital return. E.g., -1 J.K. LASSER, ESTATE TAX
TECHNIQUES 766 (1969); Cohen, Recent Developments in the Taxation of Private Annuities, U.
So. CAL. 1964 TAX INsT. 491,496; Ekman, supra note 2, at 428; Farmer, PrivateAnnuities: Their
Tax Consequences From Buyer's and Seller's Viewpoints, 101 TRUSTS & Es. 28, 29 (1962);
Goldberg, Annuities, A ComparativeAnalysis: Intra-Family.College-Type, Commercial, N.Y.U.
22ND INST. ON FED. TAX 1213, 1229 (1964); Wallace, supra note 2, at 358. The majority's method
has considerable merit in that it taxes the annuitant on excess payments received in the same
manner as an annuitant who transfers an equivalent value in cash rather than property. S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1954), reprinted in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4641
(1954). The courts have consistently held that it makes no difference whether the consideration
paid for the annuity is property or cash. Cases cited note 58 infra.
12. According to U.S. Life Table 38 (see notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text), the
present value of the taxpayer-father's annuity contract is $47,713.08. The difference between this
amount and the father's adjusted basis for the capital asset transferred ($20,000) is capital gain.
13. "The gain should be reported ratably over the period of years measured by the
annuitant's life expectancy and only from that portion of the annual proceeds which is includible
in gross income by virtue of the application of section 72 of the 1954 Code." Rev. Rul. 69-74,
1969-1 Cum. BULL. 43,43-44.
14. The "exclusion ratio" is defined in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 72(b): "Gross income
does not include that part of any amount received as an annuity under an annuity. . . contract
which bears the same ratio to such amount as the investment in the contract (as of the annuity
starting date) bears to the expected return under the contract (as of such date)." Section
72(c)(I)(A) defines the "investment in the contract" as "the aggregate amount of premiums or
other consideration paid for the contract." The "expected return" equals the annual proceeds
multiplied by the annuitant's life expectancy which, according to § 72(c)(3)(A), "shall be
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"investment in the contract," applied only to determine his
recovery of his capital investment,' 5 is not the fair market value of

the consideration furnished for the annuity but rather the
annuitant's adjusted basis for the consideration furnished.'"
(3) There is no increase in the annuitant's basis for the
capital gains tax paid each year. The annuitant's "investment in
the contract" continues to be his basis for the consideration paid

for the annuity even though he is currently paying taxes on the
capital gain that is said to be realized.'

(4) If the annuitant outlives his life expectancy, his
"investment in the contract" continues to be his basis even though
he has paid a tax and incurred a cost."

(5) U.S. Life Table 3819 is to be used in determining the
present value of a private annuity contract."

(6)

Revenue Ruling 239, 1 having been issued under the 1939

computed with reference to actuarial tables prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate." In the
instant ruling, the Service apparently relied on Table IV in Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1957). Applying
these annuity rules to the facts in Rev. Rul. 69-74, the IRS arrived at the following figures. The
expected return under the contract is 10.1 x $7,200 or $72,720. The investment in the contract is
$20,000 (the father's adjusted basis for the transferred property; see note 16 infra), and that
amount divided by $72,720 (the expected return) produces an exclusion ratio of 27.5%.
15. Prior to Rev. Rul. 69-74, the higher exclusion ratio (see note 16 infra) was first applied
to recoup the annuitant's basis for the transferred property. After full recovery of the basis, the
exclusion ratio portion of each payment was taxed as gain from the sale of the property until the
gain realized was fully reported.
16. Under § 22(b)(2)(A) of the 1939 Code, the "aggregate premiums or consideration
paid" for a private annuity (the equivalent of the "investment in the contract"
under § 72(c)(1)(A) of the 1954 Code) was the fair market value of the property on the date of
exchange. Jane J. de Canizares, 32 T.C. 345, 352-53 (1959), acquiesced in, 1959-2 CuM, BULL.
4; Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 53. Although there are no cases concerning the
determination of the "investment in the contract" under the 1954 Code, it had been assumed,
prior to the issuance of Rev. Rul. 69-74, that the fair market value rule stated in the de Canizares
case applied equally under § 72. See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON ESTATE AND TAX PLANNING, Report
of Subcommittee on Private Annuities and Estate Planning, 102 TRUSTS & Es. 952, 954 (1963);
Cohen, supra note II, at 494-95. The reason given by the IRS for its change of position was as
follows: "Since the amount of the gain is not taxed in full at the time of the transaction, such
amount does not represent a part of the 'premiums or other consideration paid' for the annuity
contract." Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 43, 44.
17. "'The exclusion ratio of 27.5 percent [determined by dividing $20,000 (the annuitant's
basis for the property transferred) by $72,720 (the expected return)] is applicable throughout the
life of the contract." Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 43, 44.
18. Seenote l 7 supra.
19. U.S. Life Table 38 is contained in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) (date of Table is 193941).
20. The IRS ruled that Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(e)()(iii)(b)(3) (1957) prescribes the use of
U.S. Life Table 38 for valuing a private annuity contract.
21. 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 53. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
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Code, is not determinative under section 72(b) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code.

II.

SIGNIFICANCE AND EFFECT OF REVENUE RULING

A.

69-74

Valuation of Annuity Contract

A basic problem in all private annuity transactions is the
assignment of a proper value to the annuitant's contractual right to
receive life payments from the obligor. There are three methods which
have been used to determine the value of an annuity contract: (1)by
utilizing U.S. Life Table 38 contained in Treasury Regulation
§ 20.2031-7(f); (2) by deriving the value of a comparable commercial
annuity; (3) by employing an actuary who would derive the value from
an examination of the particular facts of the transaction.
The use of U.S. Life Table 38 to value private annuity contracts,
the method of valuation adopted in Revenue Ruling 69-74, has recently
been approved by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dix v.
Commissioner.22 The Fourth Circuit upheld the reasonableness of U.S.
Life Table 38, however, as against only two methods of attack. First,
the annuitant argued that the appropriate table in Treasury Regulation
section 1.72-9 should be used to determine the present value of the
annuity contract.3 Second, the annuitant argued in the alternative that
the annuity contract should be valued according to what a commercial
life insurance company would have charged for a comparable contract.
The court's answer to the taxpayer's first contention was that "Treas.
Reg. § 1.72-9, Table I is a table of life expectancies of persons who
have purchased annuity contracts from commercial insurance
companies. ' 24 Similarly, the court disposed of the taxpayer's second
contention by holding that rates charged by commercial life insurance
companies are affected by several factors, not present in private annuity
transactions, which operate to increase the cost of commercial annuity
contracts above the cost of private annuity contracts with comparable
payments. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied solely upon the
22. 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968), affg46 T.C. 796 (1966).
23. The tables in Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1957) list remaining life expectancies ("expected
return multiples") according to age and sex. After obtaining this figure, the taxpayer argued, the
Commissioner should then obtain the proper multiple (to be multiplied times the annual annuity
payment to produce the annuity contract's present value) by referring to any available table which
lists such multiples according to the annuitant's remaining life expectancy and an assumed rate
of interest. In his brief, the taxpayer-annuitant used Table 7 (Present Value of Annuity of I at
End of Each Period) in ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 1444-45 (W.A. Paton ed. 1947).
24. 392 F.2d at 317 (emphasis added).
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testimony of one expert witness, an actuary with the IRS, who listed
the "several factors" as follows:

5

(1) Commercial life insurance

companies are regulated by state law which restricts their investments
and requires them to maintain sufficient reserves to assure that annuity
payments can be made. (2) Insurance company annuity prices contain
a margin for anticipated expenses and profits. (3) Insurance companies
ba se their prices for annuity contracts on mortality tables' reflecting
longer than average life expectancies over which payments must be
made.2 1 Obviously, the Dix court's holding that Treasury Regulation
section 20.2031-7(f) (prescribing the use of U.S. Life Table 38 to value

private annuity contracts) is valid is limited to its reasonableness as
compared with tables used by commercial life insurance companies.
The taxpayer in Dix posed no alternative method of valuation against
which the court could judge the regulation's validity. While the cost of

a comparable commercial annuity should, perhaps, not be used to value
a private annuity, it does not necessarily follow that the use of U.S.

Life Table 38 is reasonable. U.S. Life Table 38 is subject to several
serious infirmities. First, it makes no distinction between males and
females, as do all commercial annuity.tables. 21 Second, many experts
feel that the Commissioner's tables contained in Treasury Regulation
section 20.2031-7(f) are actuarially unsound since they are based on life

expectancy as it existed more than 30 years ago.2 8 Third, the
Commissioner's tables fail to take into account the annuitant's state
of health.29 In Revenue Ruling 69-74, the only justification given for
the use of U.S. Life Table 38 is that "[slection 1.101-2(e)(iii)(b)(3) of

the regulations prescribes the appropriate table to be used for valuing
a private annuity contract." 3 The flaw in this reasoning is that
25. Brief for Respondent at 21, 3435, Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968).
26. According to the witness's testimony, such mortality tables are used because actuarial
experience has shown that on the average annuitants live longer than the general population since
one does not ordinarily buy an annuity unless he knows he is in good health. Id. at 35.
27. Brief for Petitioners at 24a-25a, Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968).
Under the 1937 Standard Insurance Annuity Table and the tables in Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9,
females have a 5 year longer life expectancy than males.
28. Cohen, supra note I1,at 505; Ekman, supra note 2, at 423. The courts, however, have
generally been reluctant to disallow the use of obviously out-of-date annuity tables to determine
the value of private annuities. See, e.g., McMurtry v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 659 (Ist Cir. 1953);
Koshland's Estate v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1949).
29. It should be noted, however, that where the physical condition of an annuitant is so
hopeless that normal life expectancy is drastically shortened, the courts have abandoned the
Commissioner's actuarial tables and have held that valuation may be made by reference to actual,
rather than statistical, life expectancy. E.g., Estate of John P. Hoelzel, 28 T.C. 384, 389 (1957),
acquiesced in, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 5; Estate of N.M. Butler, 18 T.C. 914, 919-20 (1952);
Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760, 770 (1949); Estate of Nellie H. Jennings, 10 T.C. 323, 32728 (1948); Estate of J.H. Denbigh, 7 T.C. 387, 389 (1946).
30. 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 43.
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Treasury Regulation section 1.101-2(e)(1) applies only "where death

benefits are paid in the form of annuity payments.

31

Taxpayers' efforts to persuade courts to base the valuation of a

private annuity contract on the cost of a comparable commercial
annuity have sometimes been successful. 32 More recently, the IRS has

ruled that annuity contracts issued by organizations that "from time
to time" enter into agreements to pay life annuities "are sufficiently
comparable to individual annuity contracts issued by commercial

insurance companies to justify the application of a similar standard of
valuation to both."

The Fourth Circuit in Dix refused to extend this

ruling to an annuity issued by a private individual. 34 Nevertheless, there
is something to be said for using the cost of a comparable commercial
annuity to value a private annuity. The basic advantage this method
of valuation has over the use of U.S. Life Table 38 is that tables used
by commercial insurance companies are up-to-date. 35 Thus, the

multiples contained in these tables will reflect today's longer life
expectancies.

Mortality tables used by commercial insurance

companies also have different sets of figures for males and females,

3
since females on the average tend to live five years longer than males. 1
Moreover, commercial insurance companies vary their assumed rate of

interest37 according to fluctuations in the economy. U.S. Life Table 38,
on the other hand, establishes an arbitrary rate of return of three and

one-half percent. The pitfalls involved in using the cost of a comparable commercial annuity to value a private annuity have already been

pointed out. Like U.S. Life Table 38, commercial mortality tables fail
38
to take into consideration the annuitant's state of health.
Furthermore, at least according to one expert and one United States

court of appeals, several factors peculiar to the life insurance industry
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.101(2)(e)(1) (1957) (emphasis added).
32. E.g., Maud Gillespie, 43 B.T.A. 399, 405-06 (1941), acquiesced in, 1941-1 Cum. BULL.
5; Anna L. Raymond, 40 B.T.A. 244, 249 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 31, affd,
114 F.2d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 710 (1940).
33. Rev. Rul. 62-137, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 28.
34. "It will be noted that, by its terms, this ruling [Rev. Rul. 62-137] applies only 'ao
organizations which enter into annuity contracts 'from time to time.' We believe that it was
intended to embrace only those organizations which write enough annuity contracts to obtain a
good spread of the actuarial risk." 392 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1968).
35. U.S. Life Table 38 was computed in the period from 1939 to 1941. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-7(e).
36. Note 27 supra.
37. The assumed rate of interest on the unpaid principal (sometimes called the discount
rate) is one of 3 elements involved in actuarially computing the value of an annuity. The other 2
elements are the amount of each periodic payment and the life expectancy of the annuitant.
38. But see note 29 supra.
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make it unrealistic to determine the value of a private annuity by
deriving the value of a comparable commercial annuity.30

Since both U.S. Life Table 38 and commercial annuity tables are
unsatisfactory means by which to value private annuity contracts, it is
submitted that the best method of valuation would be to allow the
annuitant to make his own estimate of the annuity contract's worth."
He could initially undergo a thorough physical examinatioh in order
to determine whether it is proper to apply a life expectancy table in his
particular case.4 Then the annuitant could hire an independent actuary
who would apply the current interest rate to a modern life expectancy
table if the annuitant's state of health is satisfactory and, if not, to an
estimated life expectancy figure agreed upon by at least two competent
physicians who* have examined the annuitant. The parties should be
certain to specify in their contract the actuarial foundations upon
42
which the annuity's value is based.
In view of the justified criticism that has been levied against
Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-7(f) 43 and the relative merit in
allowing the annuitant to make his own estimate of the annuity's
worth, it seems that the regulation should be held invalid as a means
of valuing private annuity contracts.14 Whether or not the
39. Text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
40. Several income tax cases have permitted the taxpayer to make his own determination
of the value of the annuity. In Commissioner v. John C. Moore Corp., 42 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir.
1930), the court held that "[tihe parties were free to ignore the mortality tables and to make their
own estimate; in view of Mrs. Moore's [the annuitant's] condition of health at the time, they were
justified in basing their calculations on a life probability of not more than eleven years. [Mrs.
Moore had a remaining life expectancy, according to mortality tables, of 17.4 years, but she was
in very poor health.] That subsequent events showed her to be much hardier than either party
suspected cannot affect the contract made [earlier]." See also Gladys Chessman Evans, 30 T.C.
798, 803-04 (1958) (annuitant's financial advisers based their valuation upon a commercial
annuity applied to the particular facts of her case).
41. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
42. One writer is of the opinion that the Commissioner's success in persuading the courts
to accept his tables against various forms of challenge is due largely to the failure of the
contracting parties to specify in their contract the actuarial foundations upon which the annuity's
value is based. Wallace, supra note 2, at 372. Another writer also suggests that if all the factors
of the annuity are negotiated at arms length, no gift tax should be imposed even if the
Commissioner attacks the annuitant for using his own actuarial valuation instead of the tables
in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f. Cohen, supra note 11, at 515.
43. Text accompanying notes 27-29 supra. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-70) contains U.S. Life
Table 38.
44. The Fourth Circuit's holding in Dix v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1968),
limited to its facts, sustains the validity of Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) only as against 2
alternative modes of attack: first, that the Commissioner's annuity tables contained in Treas.
Reg. § 1.72-9 should be used to value private annuity contracts, and second, that private annuity
contracts should be valued according to the cost of a comparable commercial annuity. The
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Commissioner will be allowed to continue to use the tables in Treasury
Regulation section 20.2031-7(f) to value private annuities is of critical

importance to the annuitant in terms of tax consequences. First, the
annuitant's gift tax liability, if any, is measured as the excess of the
value of the property transferred over the value of the annuity. Using
U.S. Life Table 38, based on low life expectancies, produces a low

multiple and thus a low annuity value, thereby increasing the amount

of the gift from the annuitant to the obligor.4 5 Second, prior to Revenue
Ruling 69-74, the "investment in the contract" was generally thought

to be the fair market value of the property transferred;" but where the
transaction contained a gift element, the "investment in the contract"

could only be determined by the value of the annuity contract.

7

This

lower "investment in the contract" decreased the exclusion ratio and
thereby increased the interest element.4
B. Sale-PurchaseTheory

The property transferred by the annuitant is usually not cash but
some other type of property interest such as corporate stock.

For this

reason, the acquisition of an annuity for property must be viewed as
either (1) two transactions, a sale of the property and a simultaneous

purchase of the annuity with the proceeds therefrom, or (2) one
transaction only, the purchase of an annuity in exchange for the
taxpayer failed to raise, and the court in Dix did not mention, whether Treas. Reg. § 20.20317(t) would be deemed valid when compared with the valuation method of allowing the parties to
assess the annuity themselves.
45. Compare U.S. Life Table 38 (designated as Table 1) in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(0
with the more modern mortality table in Rev. Rul. 62-137, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 28. If the IRS
had used the table in Rev. Rul. 62-137, instead of U.S. Life Table 38, to value the annuity in
Rev. Rul. 69-74, the annuity's value would have been (8.043 + .482) x $7,200 = $61,380. Thus,
since the value of the property was $60,000, there would have been no gift from the annuitant to
the obligor.
46. Note 16 supra and accompanying text.
47. In other words, the annuitant's "investment in the contract" (the fair market value of
the property transferred) had to be decreased by the amount of the gift. E.g., Edmund A.
41,184, at 374, 375 (1941).
Steenburg, 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. Dec.
48. The end result is that the annuitant's income, taxable at ordinary rates, is increased.
See note 9 supra.
49. Anything can be transferred for an annuity: homes, rental units, vacant lots, sailboats,
merchant steamers, machinery, oil wells, jewelry, automobiles, furniture, and stamp collections.
Nor need the annuitant transfer his entire interest in the property transferred. For example, a
farmer may transfer an acreage from his farm, or a doctor may transfer an interest in his clinic
building. One may transfer partnership interests, interests in trusts and estates, and various types
of claims and choses in action. The ability of the obligor to pay should be considered in deciding
what type of property to transfer. If the transferee-obligor has substantial independent income,
almost anything can serve, but if he has only limited income, the property transferred should be
of a type which the obligor can resell or borrow against.
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transfer of property. The first view, commonly referred to as the "SalePurchase Theory," had been consistently applied by both the courts
and the Commissioner prior to Revenue Ruling 69-74.5D Since
presumably the supposed sale of the property yields proceeds equal to
its fair market value, the "Sale-Purchase Theory" explains why the

fair market value of the property at the date of the transfer was used
as the cost of the annuity (referred to as the "investment in the
contract" by the 1954 Code).5' Under the second view, which is
adopted by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 69-74,'2 the "investment in the
contract" is the annuitant's adjusted basis for the property transferred.
The Service's solution to the natural consequence of its
abandonment of the "Sale-Purchase Theory" defies logic. The

annuitant's "investment in the contract" is the numerator of the
exclusion ratio fraction under section 72; the use of a lower figure as
the numerator produces a lower exclusion ratio and, therefore, more
ordinary income. Using the annuitant's basis for the property rather
than its fair market value as his "investment in the contract" also
means that only the basis can be recouped out of the excluded portion

during the annuitant's remaining life expectancy. Thus, the annuitant
must receive his capital gain 53 out of the nonexcluded portion of each
payment. 5 Accordingly, Revenue Ruling 69-74 provides that each
annuity payment is part capital gain and part ordinary income.55 This
unusual income tax treatment of the private annuity transaction is not
50. See, e.g., Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944); Jane J. de Canizares,
32 T.C. 345 (1959), acquiesced in, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 4; John C. Moore Corp., 15 B.T.A. 1140,
1144 (1929), affd, 42 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1930); Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 53. See note
16 sup ra.
51. See cases cited note 50 supra.
52. The IRS appears to be adopting the position of the court in Ware v. Commissioner,
159 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1947), which is the only court decision standing for this view. However,
the court in Ware held that all annuity payments received which were not attributable to the
adjusted basis would be taxed as ordinary income, whereas the IRS in Rev. Rul. 69-74 ruled that
capital gain must be reported out of the portion of each annuity payment which would otherwise
be ordinary income.
53. This assumes that the property constitutes a capital asset within the meaning of INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221.
54. Prior to Rev. Rul. 69-74, the entire nonexcluded portion of each annuity payment was
always thought to be the interest element, taxed as ordinary income. E.g., ABA Comm. ON
ESTATE AND TAX PLANNING, supra note 16, at 954; Ekman, Private Annuities, 22 OtIio ST. L.J.
279, 283 (1961); Fair, McKinster & Zisman, The Private Annuity, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 338,
340 (1968); 1 J.K. LASSER, supra note 1i, at 763; Middleditch, supra note 2, at 478.
55. The IRS requires that the total capital gain be divided by the annuitant's remaining
life expectancy and reported ratably over such period. Ordinary income equals total annual
payments minus the sum of the excluded portion plus the capital gain. After the capital gain has
been fully reported, all subsequent amounts received, after applying the exclusion ratio, are to be
treated as ordinary income.
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only completely new,56 but also seems to violate the intention of
Congress expressed in section 72 of the 1954 Code that the nonexcluded
portion represents interest income, all of which is taxed as ordinary
income.57 Section 72 makes sense only if the numerator of the exclusion
ratio fraction is the property's fair market value on the date of
exchange and the entire nonexcluded portion of each annuity payment
is treated as interest income received in excess of fair market value.
Section 72 was written to apply to a transfer of cash in exchange for
an annuity. In this situation, Congress would be interested in taxing
as interest income only the portion of each annuity payment which
remains after a fraction equal to the total amount of cash paid for the
annuity divided by the annuitant's remaining life expectancy is applied
to each payment. In other words, the exclusion ratio would equal the
cash paid for the annuity divided by the expected return. It has long
been held that it makes no difference whether the consideration paid
for the annuity was property rather than money.5 8 Therefore, the
numerator of the exclusion ratio should be the property's fair market
value, since the annuitant would merely have to sell his property to a
third party (for its fair market value) and exchange the cash proceeds
to the transferee-obligor in order to achieve such a result.
Even if the courts adopt the reasoning underlying the IRS's ruling
that the "investment in the contract" is the annuitant's adjusted basis
for the property transferred,5 9 under this very reasoning the
"investment in the contract" must be an amount in excess of basis.
The Service stated that "[s]ince the amount of the gain is not taxed in
full at the time of the transaction, such amount does not represent a
part of the [investment in the contract]." 60 According to this reasoning,
any part of the gain which is taxed "at the time of the transaction"
(in year 1) should be added to basis in determining the annuitant's
"investment in the contract."'6 In each year thereafter, the "investment
56.

See note 54 supra.

57. See 3 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4157-58 (1954). 58. E.g., Ware v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1947); Gillespie v. Commissioner,
128 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. John C. Moore Corp., 42 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1930);
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 15 B.T.A. 20 (1929); Florence L. Klein, 6 B.T.A. 617 (1927).
59. Prior to Rev. Rul. 69-74, courts and tax scholars had consistently assumed that the
"Sale-Purchase Theory" applied to private annuity transactions, rendering an "investment in the
contract" equal to the property's fair market value on the date of transfer. Notes 50-51 supra

and accompanying text.
60. 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 43,44.
61. Since Rev. Rul. 69-74 requires that capital gain be reported ratably over the annuitant's
remaining life expectancy, the'gain taxed in year I equals the total capital gain ($27,713.08)
divided by the remaining life expectancy (10.1 years) or $2,743.87. This figure added to the basis
of $20,000 would produce a $22,743.87 "investment in the contract" in year 1.
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in the contract" should be increased by the amount of additional gain

taxed in that year.6"
C.

Payments Received After Capital Gain is Fully Reported

The next problem that arises is how to tax payments received by
the annuitant after he has outlived his life expectancy. Prior to Revenue

Ruling 69-74, the long-lived annuitant posed only one problem: How
3
are continuing payments attributed to. the exclusion ratio to be taxed?

The lesser nonexcluded portion, which had constituted the interest
element since the first year of the transaction,"4 simply continued as

such. Revenue Ruling 69-74, by adopting a much lower exclusion ratio
which it rules is to remain fixed even as the gain is taxed, raises an
additional problem: What is the excluded portion? Since the capital

gain should be added to the annuitant's "investment in the contract"
(basis) as he is taxed on it,5 the excluded portion should equal basis
plus total capitalgain; this sum is then divided by the expected return.

The remainder of each payment (the nonexcluded portion), taxed as
ordinary income, would remain constant throughout the life of the
contract. Under Revenue Ruling 69-74, however, the nonexcluded
portion suddenly jumps from 2,476.13 dollars to 5,200.00 dollars per

year. 6 This sudden increase in the annuitant's tax bill defeats the
express intent of Congress in enacting section 72 of the 1954 Code. The

Senate Report on the 1939 Code rule67 specifically limited the

62. In each year after year 1, $2,743.87, should be added to the previous year's "investment
in the contract" figure until the total capital gain plus basis plus the gift element equal the
property's fair market value (in the year the annuitant reaches his life expectancy). See note 61
supra.
63. The majority and better-reasoned view was that the excluded portion of payments
received by the annuitant after he had fully recouped his capital gain should be tax-free. See notes
I I supra and 69 infra.
64. Note 54 supra.
65. Text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
66. Rev. Rul. 69-74 provides that capital gain is to be reported ratably over the annuitant's
life expectancy, but only out of the portion of each payment otherwise taxable as ordinary income.
Thus, after the annuitant has fully reported capital gain, the entire nonexcluded portion (72.5%
of each annuity payment in Rev. Rul. 69-74) becomes taxable as ordinary income. A quote by
M. Paul Andro seems applicable here: "There is no magic potion which transforms payments
which are similar in nature and kind from capital gains to ordinary income simply because the
annuitant's consideration for the annuity contract has been recovered." Andro, Non-Commercial
Annuities-Income Tax Consequences To The Transferor Who Exchanges Property In Return
For An Annuity, 9 TAX L. REv. 85, 96 (1953).
67. INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 22(b)(2)(A). For the IRS's application of this section of
the 1939 Code to private annuities, see Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
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application of the exclusion ratio to payments received during the
annuitant's life expectancy period:
the
This present rule [1939 Code rule] is objectionable because ...
annuitant finds that after being retired for a few years and becoming accustomed
to living on a certain amount of income after tax, he suddenly has to make a
sizable downward adjustment in his living standard because, when his exclusion
is used up, the annuity income becomes fully taxable.68

While Revenue Ruling 69-74 correctly states that the excluded portion
maintains its tax-free status even after the annuitant has outlived his

life expectancy,69 this is an illusory break for the annuitant-taxpayer
since his total tax bill in these years is increased by one-third.70
D.

Is the Exchange a Taxable Event?

In the landmark case of Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 7 l the
Supreme Court established the proposition that when one sells property
having a known cost, this cost must be deducted from gross receipts

in determining taxable income.72 Burnet v. Logan73 adopted the position
taken in Doyle but carried it further by setting the time when a tax-

payer would be required to report his gain:
The liability for income tax ultimately can be fairly determined without resort to
mere estimates, assumptions and speculation. When the profit, if any, is actually
realized, the taxpayer will be required to respond. The consideration for the sale
was $2,200,000 in cash and the promise of future money payments wholly
contingent upon facts and circumstances not possible to foretell with anything like
68. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1954), reprinted in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4640 (1954).
69. The argument for excluding these payments from income is that they would be excluded
on a cash-purchased annuity (Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4(a)(4) (1956)), and the courts hold that it
makes no difference whether the consideration paid for the annuity is cash or property. Cases
cited note 58 supra. See also Goldberg, supra note 11, at 1231. The theoretical argument for the
proposition that the payments retain their tax-free status is that such payments are attributable
to the annuity and not the original sale of assets. Id. at 1229.
70. This one-third increase assumes that the taxpayer is in a 50% tax bracket. See Table 2
of the Appendix.
71. 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
72. "In order to determine whether there has been gain or loss, and the amount of the gain,
if any, we must withdraw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value
that existed at the commencement of the period under consideration." Id. at 185.
73. 283 U.S. 404 (1931). In Burnet v. Logan, the taxpayer owned stock that entitled her
to receive a portion of the ore mined by another concern. She sold this stock for cash plus a
promise by the buyer to pay 604 per ton of ore extracted from the mine. The Commissioner
claimed that the obligation of the buyer to make the 604 payments had an ascertainable fair
market value at the time of the sale, so that the transaction should be considered closed and the
recipient taxed on the fair market value of the obligation, plus the cash received, less her basis.
The taxpayer-seller claimed that her right to receive the 604 payments was impossible to value
with fair certainty and that, therefore, none of the payments she received should be taxed until
she recovered her basis in the stock.
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fair certainty. The promise was in no proper sense equivalent to cash. It had no
ascertainable fair market value. The transaction was not a closed one. Respondent
might never recoup her capital investment from payments only conditionally
promised. . . . She properly demanded the return of her capital investment before
assessment of any taxable profit based on conjecture."

In holding that none of the payments received under the contract were

taxable until the taxpayer recouped her basis, the Court analogized to
an annuity contract. 75 J. Darsie LloydB was the first private annuity
case to apply the principle of Burnet v. Logan. The Board of Tax

Appeals in Lloyd reasoned that while the present value of an annuity
issued by an insurance company regularly engaged in granting
annuities or a bank can be determined by the use of mortality tables,
when one not engaged in the business of issuing annuities is the obligor,
a new element enters the picture. This new element is the uncertainty

as to whether or not the obligor will be able to make the payments as
agreed, and it renders the value of the obligor's promise (the "amount
realized" by the annuitant) unascertainable. 77 Hence no taxable gain is
immediate because the obligor's promise is too uncertain to allow a

determination of the amount of gain to the annuitant." The important
74. Id. at 412-13.
75. The taxpayer-seller in Burnet v. Logan had also received as a bequest her mother's
rights to similar 604 payments. As to the taxation of these payments, the Court said: "If a sum
equal to the value thus ascertained [the value taken for estate tax purposes] had been invested in
an annuity contract, payments thereunder would have been free from income tax until the owner
had recouped his capital investment. We think a like rule should be applied here." Id. at 414.
76. 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936), nonacquiesced in, XV-2 CuM. BULL 39 (1936), nonacquiescence
withdrawn and acquiesced in, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 3. In Lloyd, the annuitant-taxpayer, on April
16, 1930, transferred appreciated corporate stock to his son in exchange for the son's promise to
pay him $100,000 per year for the length of their joint lives. The taxpayer did not report any
profit from the transaction in his 1930 income tax return for the reason, as stated in the return,
that the amount received did not equal the cost of the stock sold. The Commissioner assessed a
deficiency, treating the entire capital gain on the disposition of the stock as realized in 1930.
77. Since the time of the Lloyd case, the courts have come to recognize what some writers
feel is an even more compelling factor in establishing the contingency of private annuity
payments-the speculative aspect regarding the span of a single transferor's life. An insurance
company which deals with many lives can make a fairly accurate estimate of life expectancy and
offset its margin of error in forecasting in one direction in one case by compensating errors in
other cases. In other words, an insurance company's gains and losses on annuity contracts because
of short-lived and long-lived annuitants respectively average out. In the case of a private annuity,
however, the transferee-obligor has only one life with which to work and, therefore, no margin
for error. This speculative element makes it impossible to determine with any degree of certainty
the number of annuity payments that will be made prior to the annuitant's death. E.g., Fair,
McKinster & Zisman, supra note 54, at 339 &n.3; Mancina, The PrivateAnnuity, 43 TAxEs 255,
258-59 (1965).
78. It should be noted that in Lloyd and in the cases following Lloyd (cited in note 5 supra)
the promise of the obligor to make the payments was unsecured. While there is no case law for
this proposition, it has been suggested that if the obligor's promise were secured, the courts might
very well subject the annuitant to immediate taxation. See. e.g., Goldberg, supra note 1I, at 1228;
Middleditch, supra note 2, at 474-75; Wallace, supra note 2, at 354.
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distinction between obligors that are regularly engaged in the business
of issuing annuities, and those that are not, is that in the case of the
former, laws have been enacted to safeguard their investors. Although
Harold C. Lloyd, the obligor, was wealthy, he was not engaged in the

business of granting annuities, and, therefore, his investments were not
subject to restrictions and supervision as are those of insurance

companies and banks.79 Since the Lloyd decision, the principle of
Burnet v. Logan has been consistently applied to private annuity
transactions by the courts.80 Revenue Ruling 23981 administratively

implemented the principle. In 1962, the IRS ruled that if a transfer of
property is made "to an organization, such as a corporation, trust,

fund, or foundation (other than a commercial insurance company),
which, from time to time, issues annuity contracts," in exchange for a

lifetime annuity, the transaction is a taxable exchange, resulting in gain
to the transferor-annuitant in the year of exchange to the extent that
the present value of the payments to be made under the contract

exceeds the annuitant's basis in the property transferred.82 This ruling
has, however, been the subject of criticism.s3

Since the gain implicit in a private annuity transaction was not
realized by the annuitant at the time of the conveyance, the problem
arose as to when he would be required to report his gain. Hill's Estate
v. Maloney"4 is the only recorded case dealing with this problem. In
that case, consistent with the theory of Burnet v. Logan, the court held

that after the annuitant had recovered his basis in the property
79. While not mentioned in Lloyd, there are several other factors that distinguish insurance
companies from the payor of a private annuity: First, an insurance company that writes annuity
contracts is required to maintain actuarially computed reserves to meet cash requirements of the
contracts. Second, insurance companies are required to maintain minimum capital and surplus
balances. Third, the financial position of insurance companies is periodically audited on a surprise
basis. Fourth, insurance companies' administrative practices are under constant scrutiny.
80. Cases cited note 5 supra.
81.

1953-2 CUM. BULL. 53.

82. Rev. Rul. 62-136, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 12 (emphasis added). See quote from Dix v.
Commissioner regarding Rev. Rul. 62-137 in note 34 supra which applies equally to Rev. Rul.
62-136.
Mancina, supra note 77, at 259-61, which criticizes Rev. Rul. 62-136 on the
83. See, e.g.,
following grounds: (1) The IRS fails to give any indication as to how often an organization must
have issued annuity contracts before its contracts might be classified as "semi-commercial,"
resulting in immediate recognition of gain to the transferor. (2) The speculative element involved
in estimating the number of payments that the organization will have to make is not altered by
the fact that the payor is one of the organizations mentioned in the ruling. (3) If the payororganization is a marginal business or has a history of wide fluctuations in profits and losses,
any evaluation of that promise to make the payments would be meaningless. Grounds (2) and
(3), according to Mr. Mancina, may very well fail to overcome the principle of Burnet v. Logan.
84. 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944).
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transferred through successive annuity payments, he was then subject
to capital gains tax until the annuity payments were equal to the value
of the annuity contract. The IRS, in Revenue Ruling 239, specifically
adopted this method of taxing private annuities,"
The 1954 Revenue Bill, as passed by the House of Representatives,
contained a provision relating to private annuities which would have
nullified the distinction between private and commercial annuities and
taxed private annuities at the event of the contract's execution." The
Senate, however, rejected the House bill, stating that the amount of the
annuitant's gain was still too uncertain.87
In Revenue Ruling 69-74, the IRS seems to be saying that a
private annuity transaction is a taxable event. 8 Then, in order to soften
the blow, the Service allows the taxpayer-annuitant to spread out his
gain ratably over his remaining life expectancy. While this view of the
IRS was expected to be issued in the form of a Treasury Regulation,
the IRS's stand itself was no surpirse in view of the admonition
published by the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association
in 1965:
The Service currently declines to rule on private annuity transactions where the

consideration the obligor receives from the annuitant is low basis property that
has substantially appreciated in value. The Chief Counsel's office is studying

proposals for new regulations which would make it clear that in the Service's view
Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53 . . . [is] inapplicable to private annuity
transactions under, the 1954 Code. The current proposals being considered would
treat a private annuity transaction as an immediately recognizing transaction and
in effect withdraw the Service's acquiescence from the J. Darsie Lloyd (33 B.T.A.
903 (1936), Acq. 1950-2 C.B. 3) line of cases."

The validity of the IRS's new method of taxing private annuities,
which clearly constitutes a violation of the principle of Burnet v.
Logan, is discussed at pages 693-97 III infra.
E. Loss Deduction
I.

Transfer of Loss Propertyfor a Private Annuity.- If the basis

for the property transferred exceeds the present value of the annuity
received in exchange therefor,"0 a loss deduction has been denied by the
85.

1953-2 CuM. BULL. 53, 54.

86. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1241 (1954).
87. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1954).
88. "The gain realized on the transaction is determined by comparing the transferor's basis
in the property with the present value of the annuity." 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 43 (emphasis added),
89. 18 ABA BULLETIN OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION 76 (Pt. I, Jan. 1965).
90. Of the 3 methods used to value annuity contracts (see section I. A. para. I, at 679
supra), the IRS in Rev. Rul. 69-74 uses the method which produces the lowest possible value,
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courts9 on two grounds: First, the purchase of a private annuity is not

a "transaction entered into for profit." Second, since no gain is
realized on the date of the transfer of appreciated property for a private

annuity on the theory that the obligor's promise to make the payments
has no ascertainable value, any loss incurred on the transfer is

nondeductible for the same reason.12 From this second ground for
denying the loss deduction, it logically follows that under Revenue

Ruling 69-74's holding that gain is realized on the exchange, and then
reported ratably over the annuitant's remaining life expectancy, the
same treatment should be accorded the transfer of loss property for a

private annuity. 3 Of course, even the problem under Revenue Ruling
69-74 of having to allocate the loss over the annuitant's life expectancy

can be avoided simply by selling the property on the open market,
thereby recognizing the loss, and then purchasing the annuity with the

proceeds from the sale.
2. Loss Upon the Premature Death of the Annuitant.-lf the
annuitant dies before he has recouped his basis in the property

transferred, his estate suffers an economic loss. The courts have
generally held that no deduction may be claimed on the annuitant's

final return or on his estate tax return. The decisions are based on two
grounds: First, the annuitant received exactly what he bargained

for-payments for life." Second, the purchase of an annuity is not a
U.S. Life Table 38, thereby increasing the probability that the basis for the property transferred
will be greater than the value of the annuity contract.
91. E.g., Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1940).
92. With respect to this second ground for denying a loss deduction, it is arguable that the
uncertainty of the obligor's performance should not prevent the recognition of a loss deduction
on the exchange. If the amount of gain or loss on a transfer is independent of the annuitant's
survival and depends solely upon the value of the annuity when acquired, then although the
uncertainty of the obligor's performance may prevent the determination of gain, it is equally clear
that the annuitant will have suffered a loss not less than the difference between the basis of the
property and the commuted value of the annuity regardless of whether or not the obligor performs
his obligation.
93. The major difficulty with this logical extension of Rev. Rul. 69-74's rationale is that
in the case of an exchange between related parties it seems to violate § 267 of the Code. While
there is no case law on point, § 267 would most likely disallow any loss deduction between
related parties.
94. Helvering v. Louis, 77 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1935), revg 29 B.T.A. 1200 (1934). In
Louis, the annuitant had purchased an annuity for the life of her mother, and upon her mother's
death prior to the time determined in the mortality tables, the annuitant claimed a loss on her
investment on the ground that she had paid for certain payments based on a given number of
years of life expectancy, some of which payments did not materialize. The court reasoned that
the taxpayer received all the payments to which she was entitled under the terms of the contract
and that there could be no loss since she received what she bargained for, Accord, I.T. 2915, XIV2 CuM. BULL. 98 (1935).
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transaction entered into for profit.9 5 Although not adopted by any
courts, a third ground for denying the private annuitant a loss
deduction has been suggested where the annuity transaction is between
related persons: section 267 of the 1954 Code. While the first two
grounds have been repeated frequently, they have also been the subject
of well-reasoned and persuasive criticism. With respect to the question
of whether the annuitant received exactly what he bargained for, an
analogy may be drawn to an option wherein the purchaser is not
disallowed a deduction when the option lapses even though he has
acquired what he bargained for.17 As to the question of whether the
contract is negotiated for profit, it has been suggested that since
investing just to receive interest would qualify as a transaction entered
into for profit, it is erroneous to distinguish a private annuity because
it is based on an assumed interest rate and a mortality table. 8 In
addition, it may be argued that an investor purchases an annuity for
the same reason that he purchases stocks, bonds, or other incomeproducing property. The motive of security and assurance of regular
income is present in both commercial and noncommercial annuity
transactions as it is in many other investment transactions which are,
nevertheless, regarded as being entered into for profit. In order to
accord noncommercial annuity transactions the same treatment as
commercial annuity transactions, 9 there should at least be a
presumption that the transaction was entered into for profit.100 A policy
consideration overriding our revenue laws has been suggested as a basis
for allowing the short-lived annuitant a deduction for his loss: Some
provision should be made available for the investor to recover his
capital invested, whether it be amortized by depreciation or depletion,
95.

Industrial Trust Co. v. Broderick, 94 F.2d 927 (lst Cir. 1938) (court said purchase of

annuities was not a transaction entered into for profit; decedent had sought only security and
peace of mind during his life, and upon his diath .he had received all that he had contracted to

receive).
96.
'97.
98.
99.

Cohen, supra note II, at 498; Wallace, supra note 2, at 359.
Goldberg, supra note II, at 1221.
Id.
See George M. Cohan, I I B.T.A. 743 (1928) (when transaction entered into for profit,

loss deductible where taxpayer forfeited commercial annuity contracts); I.T. 3567, 1942-2 Cum.
BULL. 105 (ordinary loss resulted where annuitant surrendered commercial policies for an amount

of cash less than his investment). But see Early v. Atkinson, 175 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1949), rev'g
5 P-H 1948 FED. TAX SERV.

72,586 (D. Va. 1948), where the district court sustained the

deductibility of a loss on surrender of commercial annuities but was reversed by the court of
appeals on the ground that the primary motive of the annuitant in executing the contracts with
commercial companies was desire for security rather than profit.
100. Galvin, Income Tax Consequences of Agreements Involving Noncommercial
Annuities, 29 TEXAS L. REv. 469, 501-02 (1951).
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written off as a loss deduction, or claimed as basis on a sale or
disposition.'"' Thus, an inequity existed even under prior law when the
annuitant was permitted to apply a high exclusion ratio to each
payment received and treat this excluded portion as a tax-free return

of capital until his basis for the property transferred was fully
recovered.' 0

2

Revenue Ruling 69-74 compounds this inequity by

lowering the exclusion ratio, thus making the annuitant recoup his
basis over a longer period of time, 0 3 and requiring the annuitant to
report his capital gain at the same time he is recouping his basis. 04
Under Revenue Ruling 69-74, if the annuitant dies any.time prior to
his life expectancy, he will not only have not recovered his basis but

will have already paid a capital gains tax.
III.
A.

VALIDITY OF REVENUE RULING

69-74

New Scheme of Taxing PrivateAnnuities

Revenue Ruling 69-74 violates prior court decisions and even the
Service's own former position regarding the income taxation of private
annuities. 05 While this prior law existed under the 1939 Code, it had
been thought to apply equally to the 1954 Code. 08 The congressional
intent behind section 72 of the 1954 Code would call for the application
of this prior law to the existing statute, not its inapplicability as
101. Id.at 501.
102. Notes 15-16 supra. For an explanation of the theoretical basis underlying the use of
the transferred property's fair market value as the annuitant's "investment in the contract," see
the text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
103. Rev. Rul. 69-74 uses the annuitant's basis for the property transferred, rather than
its fair market value, as the numerator of the exclusion ratio fraction (the "investment in the
contract"). This results in basis being recouped in equal yearly portions over the annuitant's
remaining life expectancy (10+ years in Rev. Rul. 69-74), instead of in 4+ years (if prior law
had been applied to the facts in Rev. Rul. 69-74). For an explanation of the theoretical basis
underlying the use of the annuitant's basis in the property transferred as his "investment in the
contract," see the text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
104. See note 55 supra and text accompanying notes 54-55.
105. Notes 73-81 supra and accompanying text. Replying to the statement in Rev. Rul. 6974 that "Revenue Ruling 239, C.B. 1953-2, 53 . . .was issued under different provisions of prior
law, [and] is not determinative under section 72(b) of the Code," one author recently stated:
"This rationale hardly seems enough to support a change of position after more than 15 years."
Ekman, supra note 2, at 427 n.8a.
106. In 1955, the IRS even issued a private ruling which applied Rev. Rul. 239 to the 1954
Code and taxed the annuity transaction as follows. The excluded portion (equal to the fair market
value of the property transferred divided by the expected return) was received tax-free until the
annuitant had recovered his basis. Then the excluded portion was taxable as capital gain until
the fair market value of the property was reached. Thereafter the entire excluded portion of each
payment was nontaxable. Letter Ruling 9-9-55
76, 312 P-H FED. TAx SERVICE 1956, cited in
Cohen, supra note 11, at 495.
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decreed in Revenue Ruling 69-74. Congress's purpose in enacting
section 72 of the current Code was twofold: (1) to increase the
likelihood that the annuitant would recover his cost tax-free, and (2)
to eliminate the sudden shock of increased taxation, once cost had been
recouped, that existed under the 1939 Code. 0 7 In an area where
Congress has given neither the Treasury Department nor the IRS the
power to make law,1 8 there is a clear violation of congressional intent.
With respect to Congress's first purpose in enacting section 72,
Revenue Ruling 69-74 decreases the chances that the annuitant will
recover his basis prior to his death by spreading out the recovery period
over a greater number of years.' With regard to the second purpose
of Congress in enacting section 72, in Revenue Ruling 69-74 the
portion of each annual payment subject to ordinary income tax
suddenly jumped from 2,476.13 dollars to 5,220.00 dollars at the end
of the annuitant's life expectancy." 0
Revenue Ruling 69-74 imposes an additional burden on the
annuitant by taxing him at the outset on his capital gain. This unfairly
taxes the annuitant on a capital gain before he has recouped his
investment. Thus if the annuitant does not live long enough to recover
his basis, which is very likely,"' he is nonetheless taxed on capital gain
prior to his realization thereof.
The courts have struck down such unauthorized attempts by the
I RS to write new tax legislation. A recent example involved the socalled Kintner regulations," 2 promulgated in 1960, which treated
professional organizations as corporations for federal income tax
purposes if local law recognized the requisite attributes which
distinguish corporations from partnerships.13 Three years later, after
many states had enacted professional corporation laws deliberately
107. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1954), reprinted in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4641 (1954); Ekman, Use of Private Annuities in Estate Planning, N.Y.U. 17TH INST.
ON FED. TAX. 1157, 1158 (1959).
108. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 72 does not give the Secretary or his delegate any
authority to implement its provisions.
109. See note 103 supra.
110. See Table 2 of the Appendix.
I 1l. One's life expectancy for annuity purposes is always longer than it is for life insurance
purposes. As a typical example, the annuitant's life expectancy for life insurance purposes in Rev.
Rul. 69-74 was 6.5231 years (using U.S. Life Table 38 in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(0), 'Whereas
his life expectancy for annuity purposes was 10.1 years (using Table IV in Treas. Reg. § 1.729). While this difference reflects the principle of conservatism in the life insurance industry, it
means that the annuitant may very well not live 10.1 years.
112. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (1960), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 CuNt. BULL. 412.
113. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1900), T.D.
6503, 1960-2 Cu~t. BULL. 412.
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framed to meet the regulations,"' the Treasury proposed amendments
to the 1960 Kintner regulations" 5 completely reversing its earlier
position."' The'amended regulations were once described as saying to
professionals, "Try if you want, but it can't be done.""17 Some

taxpayers, however, having felt that it could be done, took the issue of
the validity of the 1965 regulations to court. To date, the Treasury has

been singularly unsuccessful in upholding the validity of the amended

Kintner regulations." 8 A common ground for holding the regulations
invalid has been that they constitute an attempt by the Treasury to
legislate." 9 It is submitted that Revenue Ruling 69-74 likewise
constitutes an effort to write new tax legislation rather than interpret

the existing statute. Therefore, if its validity is litigated in a court of
law, it should be held invalid. Furthermore, the IRS will have a more

difficult burden in attempting to sustain the validity of Revenue Ruling

69-74 against attack than did the Treasury in the Kintner cases, 12 since

"[tjhe courts have recognized a substantial difference between Treasury
regulations and mere rulings . . . of the Internal Revenue Service. In
the latter case, not even the fiction of implied congressional approval

lends weight to such interpretations when they are challenged in court
"11t

114. To date, 47 states have some form of authorization for professional associations or
41,608, at 41,621.
corporations. 5 P-H FED. TAXES
115. 28 Fed. Reg. 13750 (1963). These proposed amendments became final in 1965. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-1 (1965), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 553.
116. The Treasury returned the emphasis from local law to federal law for determining the
classification of organizations for federal tax purposes. For a detailed study of the regulation
changes, see Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations,
49 MINN. L. REV. 603 (1965).
117. Thies, An Open Letter to a Former Secretary of the Treasury, 46 TAXES 529, 531
(1968).
118. Cochran v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Ariz. 1969); Kelsey v. United States,
24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 69-5468 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Mendelsohn v. United States, 24 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 69-5471 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Smith v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D. Fla. 1969);
Wallace v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968), appeal docketed, No. 19666, 8th
Cir., March 10, 1969 (IRS indicated it will not press its appeal, T.I.R. 1019); Holder v. United
States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (IRS indicated it will not appeal, T.I.R. 1019); Kurzner
v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968), affd, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Neill
v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968), affd, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); Empey
v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), affd, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
119. E.g., O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359, 364 (N.D. Ohio 1968), affd, 410
F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 167-70 (10th Cir. 1969), affg
272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
120. Cases cited note 118 supra.
121. 5 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, Givr AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 71.03(4), at 7136-37 (1970) (citing cases).
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B. Constitutionality
The sixteenth amendment of the United States Constitution,
adopted in 1913, provides:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from

whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.'2

In attempting to define what the term "income" meant, the Supreme
Court in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.123 held that in the case of a
sale of property having a known cost, the only income is the excess, if
any, of the sale price over the cost. 124 Burnet v. Logan'n adopted the
position taken in Doyle and held that where it is "not possible to foretell with anything like fair certainty" whether the taxpayer will recover
20
his cost, there is no "income" until he has in fact recouped his cost.
Since the Board of Tax Appeals in J. DarsieLloyd'21 applied Burnet v.
Logan to a private annuity transaction to determine the income tax
consequences to the annuitant, the courts and the IRS have consistently
followed suit.128 In Hill's Estate v. Maloney,121 the court, in discussing
the application of the Burnet v. Logan principle to the income tax
consequences of a private annuity transaction, aptly stated:
The promise of the [obligor] in the instant case to make the payments under

the annuity contracts had no ascertainable market value in [the years the
transactions took place]. The question of the [obligor's] ability to meet the

payments at a later date made the value of the annuities uncertain for purposes
of taxation. Until such time as [the annuitant] received the full value of the shares

of stock he transferred, or his death prior thereto, the transaction cannot be
considered as closed and the entire taxable gain or loss computed. The amount
received by him over and above his adjusted cost is taxable gain in the years in
which he received it.'3

With the issuance of Revenue Ruling 69-74, the IRS discarded this
equitable and constitutionally-based prior law. Even though the
annuitant may very well never recover his capital investment,' 31 the
122.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI (emphasis added).

123. 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
124. Id. at 184.
125. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
126. Id. at 412.
127. 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936), nonacquiescedin, XV-2 CuM. BULL. 39 (1936), nonacquiescence
withdrawn andacquiesced in, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 3.
128. E.g., Evans v. Rothensies, 114 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1940); Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58
F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944); Bella Hommel, 7 T.C. 992 (1946); Frank C. Deering, 40 B.T.A.
984 (1939); Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 53.
129. 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944).

130. Id. at 172.
13 1. See text accompanying notes 76-78 and note 77 supra.See also note I I I supra.
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Service now declares that he must pay a capital gains tax in the year
the transaction takes place. Thus, if either the obligor becomes unable
to pay or the annuitant dies at any time prior to the annuitant's life
expectancy date, the annuitant-taxpayer will have paid a capital gains
tax and yet never have recouped his basis. It is submitted that in a
private annuity transaction, when it cannot be determined with any
degree of certainty that the annuitant will ever recoup his basis in the
property transferred, there should be no "income" to the annuitant
within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment until he has in fact
fully recovered his basis.
IV.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The question which looms unanswered in the wake of Revenue
Ruling 69-74 is: What is the future of private annuities? At first glance,
it would appear that there is still mileage left in the private annuity
since the advantage uppermost in the minds of those who adopt private
annuities, namely reduction of the annuitant's taxable estate, is
unaffected by the ruling. It should be remembered, however, that the
objective of estate reduction is not always realistically achieved through
the use of a private annuity. The property exchanged for the private
annuity will be replaced by the total payments made to the annuitant,
which will in many cases exceed the fair market value of the property
transferred, since the annuity is valued at its actuarially commuted
value and not at the total amount of payments to be received over the
lifetime of the annuitant. Only if the annuitant does not live out his
full life expectancy will estate tax reduction be achieved.
Despite Revenue Ruling 69-74, the private annuity still provides a
device whereby an annuitant can exchange a single asset for annual
payments in cash which he can invest in diversified holdings. In this
manner, he may free himself from the risks of dependence upon a single
source of income or may turn non-income producing property into
productive yield. This diversification can no longer be made, however,
without the imposition of an immediate capital gains tax on the
property (usually appreciated) which is exchanged. Ordinary income
tax is still imposed on the portion of each payment which represents
the interest element and in the aggregate might exceed the capital gains
tax which would have been paid had the property been sold. Moreover,
under Revenue Ruling 69-74, if the annuitant outlives his life
expectancy, the tax consequences are disastrous. 3 1 One writer recently
132. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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suggested that a transfer of property for a private annuity is still
beneficial even under Revenue Ruling 69-74 where the property
transferred is mortgaged in excess of basis.' But even if a court were
to approve of this method of treating the transaction, the annuitant is
severely limited in the type of property that he can transfer.," In view

of the many weaknesses inherent in the IRS's position in Revenue
Ruling 69-74 in light of past tax policy and practice, it is believed that
the courts will refuse to uphold the ruling.*
ROBERT A. SAMS
133. Friedman, Transfer of Propertyfor Private Annuity Can Still Hold Much Appeal, 31
J. TAX 264 (1969). The author points out: "While it is problematical whether a taxpayer could
secure a court's approval of this method of treating a transaction such as presented in~our
hypothetical example, it nevertheless illustrates an inherent weakness in the Service's position in
Rev. Rul. 69-74." Id. at 267.
134. Under prior income tax treatment of private annuity transactions, an annuitant could
transfer any one of an almost infinite variety of property interests. See note 49 supra.
* This Note won first-place honors for 1970 in the First National Bank of Chicago's
Eighth Annual Estate Planning Competition.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE ANNUITY TRANSACTION
UNDER PRIOR LAW
Exclusion Ratio = 65.6%
Year

Total Receipt

Entirely Exempt
Under § 72(b)

Capital Gain

$7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
Indefinite

$4,723.20
4,723.20
4,723.20
4,723.20
1,107.20
-0-0-0-0-0$4,242.12
4,723.20
Indefinite

-0-0-0-0$3,616.00
4,723.20
4,723.20
4,723.20
4,723.20
4,723.20
481.08
-0-0-

Accumulated Total
Tax (Assuming
Annuitant in
Ordinary Income
50% Bracket)
$2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
2,476.80
Indefinite

$1,238.40
2,476.80
3,715.20
4,953.60
7,096.00
9,515.20
11,934.40
14,353.60
16,772.80
19,192.00
20,550.67
21,789.07
Add $1,238.40
more each year

TABLE 2
INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE ANNUITY TRANSACTION
UNDER REVENUE RULING 69-74
Exclusion Ratio
= 27.5%
Year

Total Receipt
$7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
7,200.00
Indefinite

Entirely Exempt
Under § 72(b) Capital Gain
$1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
1,980.00
Indefinite

$2,743.87
2,743.87
2,743.87
2,743.87
2,743.87
2,743.87
2,743.87
2,743.87
2,743.87
2,743.87
274.38
-0-0-

Accumulated Total
Tax (Assuming
Annuitant in
50% Bracket)
Ordinary Income
$2,476.13
2,476.13
2,476.13
2,476.13
2,476.13
2,476.13
2,476.13
.2,476.13
2,476.13
2,476.13
4,945.62
5,220.00
Indefinite

$1,924.04
3,848.08
5,772.12
7,696.16
9,620.20
11,544.24
13,468.28
15,392.32
17,316.36
19,240.40
21,781.81
24,391.81
Add $2,610.00
more each year

